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ABSTRACT 
 
Block argued against functionalism. The argument was metaphorized by building a normal body 
but with the brain of a homunculus. A review of the metaphorization exposes that the argument is 
inadequate to avoid the weakness of the functionalist doctrine. 
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1. FUNCTIONALISM 
 
Functionalism, or, machine functionalism, takes 
the following identity: Given certain sensory 
inputs, each type of mental states behaves as a 
disposition which 
 
(1) Acts in certain ways irrelevant of its 
internal constitution; and,  
(2) Is determined by the way it functions, or, 
the role it plays in the system where it is a 
part [1].  
 
The doctrine claims that mental states are 
functional states. The states are defined by their 
causal roles: (1) Inputs; (2) Causal relations to 
other functional states; and, (3) Outputs [2]. 
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Alternatively, it asserts that a mental state is 
determined by its causal relations to sensory 
stimulations, other mental states, and behavior 
[3].  
 
2. BLOCK’S ARGUMENT 
 
Block argued against the theory. His central 
argument is known as the “Absent Qualia 
Argument” [4]. In Nagel’s terms, what he 
questioned is: “If there is anything which it is like 
to be the homunculi (Latin: little men)-headed 
system” [5]. The argument proposed that [6]  
 
(1) Machine functionalism says that each 
mental state (e.g., a qualitative state, i.e., 
the quale, Q) is identical to a machine-
table state;  
(2) But if there is nothing it is like to be the 
homunculi-headed system, it cannot be in 
that qualitative state, even when it has the 
functionally equivalent machine-table state;  
(3) Thus, due to the prima facie doubt about 
the mentality of the homunculi-headed 
system, there is the prima facie doubt 
about that the qualitative state is identical 
to the machine-table state; 
(4) Consequently, there is prima facie doubt 
about the validity of the kind of 
functionalism under consideration. 
 
3. METAPHORIZATION 
 
Block’s argument was metaphorized by building 
a normal human body. However, its brain is 
replaced with the mind of a homunculus. The 
metaphorization happens in the following two 
dominant steps [7]:  
 
Step 1: Imaging the skull is a control center. The 
center includes: 
 
(1) A big bulletin board at the front, on which 
there is a removable notecard, that is, a 
card with a letter on it to represent the 
present Q of the system; 
(2) A bunch of numbered light, L, to simulate 
environmental causes, other mental states, 
and behavior; and,  
(3) Some buttons homunculi can press on, 
which are hooked up to the body’s motor 
system. when the buttons are pressed, the 
body moves accordingly in specific certain 
ways.  
 
Step 2: There is a machine table to describe 
functionally the mental states. It characterizes 
the relations between all Q and all L. Each 
homunculus has a job to implement a “row” on 
the table. For all the rows there are enough 
homunculi to perform the instructions of what to 
do next, how to update the state of the system, 
and which outputs to produce.  
 
In this way, the brainless body can perform just 
what a normal person wants to do. This is an 
unrealistic embarrassing result of the 
functionalist doctrine. It convinced Block to insist 
that there can be functionally equivalent systems 
which, nonetheless, do not have the same 
mentality. As a result, he doubted about the 
validity of the functionalism, as shown in point (4) 
of his argument. Interestingly, the same 
conclusion was also obtained by substituting the 
homunculi-headed robot system with another 
human-body functionalistic system [8]. 
 
4. INADEQUACY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
Due to the embarrassment encountered in the 
metaphorization, Block concluded that any 
version of functionalism “is guilty of liberalism—
classifying systems that lack mentality as having 
mentality” [9]. However, there appears a basic 
problem with his mind-related machine table: Are 
those suggested qualitative states, qualia, 
equipped by the homunculi-headed bodies, 
effective at all to represent the mental states of 
consciousness?  
 
This qualia-paradigm regards the brain neuronal 
entity as a physically linear system. It arbitrarily 
takes it for granted that the conscious process of 
the mind is simply a collection of distinct objects, 
while these objects are independent of each 
other, just as the elements given in the machine 
table. However, modern scientific development 
has demonstrated the invalidity of such a linear 
scenario. Instead, it is exhibited that the mental 
process is highly nonlinear, living in a neural 
network where signals of the neurons are 
interweaved and inseparable [10]. The 
nonlinearity characterizes the self-organizing 
consciousness of the prefrontal cortex to express 
cognitive abilities [11]. The resultant multi-
frequency chaotic states of mind are impossible 
be simplified as functionally structured machine-
table states. Both medical measurements and 
theoretical simulations of EEG brainwave 
packets [12] proved the inadequacy to employ 
the linear paradigm for human mental activities.  
 
Fig. 1 presents an example of the EEG waves 
propagating in a typical brain neuronal system
  
 
 
Ma; ARJASS, 5(1): 1-4, 2018; Article no.ARJASS.38093 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Nonlinear EEG brainwaves in typical mental states (adapted from Campisi et al. [13]) 
 
[13]. A total of five conscious levels of the mind 
are shown, from the bottom up:  
 
(1) Semiconscious (bottom panel, δ: 0.5-4 Hz 
at coma or dreamless-sleeping states);  
(2) Subconscious (lower middle panel, θ: 4-8 
Hz at drowsy, idling, dreaming, or deep-
meditation states);  
(3) Conscious (middle panel, α: 8-14 Hz at 
relaxed, reflecting, light-meditation, or 
visualization states);  
(4) Ultra-conscious (upper middle panel, β: 
14-30 Hz at perception, alerting, or 
concentration states); and,  
(5) Superconscious (top panel, γ: 30-42 Hz at 
focused states or religious ecstasy).  
 
The Figure demonstrates that the brainwaves 
manifest two groups of nonlinear features 
beyond the linear sinusoidal regime [14]:  
 
Group-1 gives complex stormy waves in the 
upper three panels, α, β, and γ, the amplitudes of 
which are highly modulated to give nonlinear 
wave-envelops [15];  
 
Group-2 presents simple waves in the lower two 
panels, θ and δ, characterized by the wave 
packets of hybrid sinusoidal and saw-tooth 
waveforms [16].  
 
Among all the conscious levels, it is hard to trace 
any signs of the Q-like components in linear 
systems. Even for the simplest Group 2, the two 
propagating trains are hardly equivalent to any 
components in the machine table. Yet, it is 
allowable to name the waves as the quasilinear 
ones which are tinted with deformed amplitudes. 
Thus, human brains are unable to be treated as 
linear systems. Consequently, Block’s qualia in 
his Absent Qualia Argument against 
functionalism cannot behave as a deciding factor 
to express the equivalent functional activities of 
the two hypothetical systems of different 
mentalities. In other words, his argument did not 
chip away the weakness of functionalism.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Block made use of a qualia-related 
metaphorization to challenge the functionalist 
thesis that mental states supervene on physical 
states. However, conscious process of the 
mental states is beyond the regime of linear 
system. The inter-independent mental elements, 
qualia, are inadequate to describe distinctive 
functional activities. Thus, Block’s argument still 
retained the weakness of the functionalist 
doctrine.  
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